Democratization of Uruguay

Giancarlo Orichio Dr. A. Arraras CPO 3055 20 November 2008 Democratic handing all over and Consolidation Uruguay A study of democratization presumes that the meaning of democratization is self-evident outlined simply as a re advancedal of a semi governmental trunk from non- common riches towards responsible and representative brass practices. (Grugel 3) A image that is valid in Uruguayan government activity nevertheless, has an element of potential risk that forget be the topic of further analysis. sound judgement of the latter go forth enable us to determine why Uruguay is the l whizsome(prenominal) wiz of the four-spot former bureaucratic- dominating governings in southwestern America that includes Chile, Brazil, and Argentina to attain this debatably semi policy- qualification status quo. Guillermo ODonnell come acrossd this eccentric person of governance as an intro that uses peremptory measures to respond to what they view as threats to capitalism, whereas , the only means of opposing this repressive government is by an unconditional commitment to body politic. (ODonnell xiii) The hierarchically lead bureaucratic- tyrannous authorities as a political actor poses a realistic advantage to democratization insofar that the armed services machine-as-institution whitethorn consider that their interests are vanquish served by extrication from the war machine-as-government. However, seizing power to a new governing body without majestic strong constraints is improbable and has occurred predictably in Uruguayan elective transition. Understanding the rampart faced by the newly little(a) participatory government in managing the army machine and eliminating its reserved do principal(prenominal)s brings us to the task at hand.First, I al embarrassed for analyze the political history in Uruguay that lead up to the no doubt controversial business line that it has attained popular consolidation. Secondly, I will analyze the factors tha t either contri howevered or hindered its tour to representative state ultimately, arriving to the conclusion that Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan describe as a risk-pr iodin consolidate democracy. On 25 August 1825, Juan Antonio Lavalleja, at the school principal of a group of patriots called the treinta y tres orientales, issued a decla balancen of independence. After a threesome-year fight, a peace treaty signed on 28 August 1828 guaranteed Uruguays independence.During this period of political turmoil and civil war, the dickens political parties around which Uruguayan history has traditionally revolved, the conscientious objectors and the Blancos, were founded. Even by West Europen standards, Uruguay had a tradition of high political party appellation and a clear sense of a left- decently index. (Linz 152) Uruguays head start president, Gen. Jose Fructuoso Rivera, an ally of Artigas, founded the Colorados. The second president, Brig. Gen. Manuel Oribe, a friend of Lava lleja, founded the Blancos. The 19th century was generally a struggle between the two factions.However, it was non until the election of Jose Batlle y Or doz as president in 1903 that Uruguay matured as a nation. The Batlle government activitys (19037, 191115) marked the period of sterling(prenominal) frugal performance. A distinguished statesman, Batlle initiated the fond welfare system codified in the Uruguayan constitution. From then on, Uruguays amicable programs, funded mainly by bread of beef and woollen in foreign marts, gave Uruguay the revered surname Switzerland of southward America. After World fight II, the Colorados ruled, turf out for an eight-year period from 195866.It was during the administration of prexy Jorge Pacheco Areco (196772) that Uruguay entered a political and fond crisis. As wool declined in world markets, exportation earnings no longer kept pace with the convey for greater social expenditures. Political instability provideed, most dram atically in the emergence of Uruguays National sacque Movement, popularly kn proclaim as the Tupamaros. This well up-organized urban guerrilla movement adopted red and nationalist ideals while on the separate hand, most nationally important actors were un-Ameri tin or at best semi-loyal to the already established republican regime.Their revolutionary activities, couple with the worsening frugal situation, exacerbated Uruguays political uncertainty. Gradually, the military-as institution assumed a greater place in government and by 1973 was in complete control of the political system. By the end of 1973, the Tupamaros had been successfully controlled and suppressed by the military-as-institution. In terms of systematic repression, as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan say, Uruguay was the most deeply repressive of the four south-central American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. (Linz 152) Amnesty internationalistic denounced Uruguay for human rights colzas in 1979, they e stimated the number of political prisoners jailed at a ratio of 1 per 600, Chile and Argentina were respectively 1 in 2,000 and 1 in 1,200. (Linz 152) By 1977 the military announced that they would mull over a new constitution with the intentions to fort democracy. The new constitution would be submitted to a plebiscite in 1980, and if ratified elections with a adept presidential candidate put forward by both the Colorados and the Blancos and approved by the military would be held the following year.The post-authoritarian transition to democracy began in Uruguay when the democratic foe win the plebiscite. By the 1980s the military did non suck in an offensive plan to subvert Uruguay from its uninterrupted crappy stinting performance, the Tupamaros had in fact been defeated by 1973, so a defense project against urban guerrilla was unnecessary. The military had no civil or political support, and with there way out in the plebiscite, whose results they said they would resp ect, tarnished the militarys political leverage significantly.Thus, the democratic opposition in the form of the two study catch all political parties that give up governed de jure since the 19 century presented a non sound alternative despite their disloyal doings before the authoritarian coup detat . As previously touched on, the opportunities presented by a hierarchical military favoring democratic transition is the possibility that the leading policemans of the military-as-institution will come to the conclusion that the cost of non democratic rule is greater than the cost of extrication.With the main interest resting in a enduring state that will in charm allow the military to become a functioning sector of the state apparatus. However, this does not preclude the possibility of non democratic prerogatives in the transfer. The party-military negotiation called the Naval union conformity disqualified Wilson Ferreira of the Blanco party to be nominated as president, pushed for guarantees concerning their own autonomy, and the most negative to democracy was the curtailment of human right trails for military officials.Elections were held in 1985 were Julio Maria Sanguinetti from the Colorado party became the firstborn democratically elected candidate in the 1977 constitution. Because of strong unrestricted discontent with Military Amnesty disposed(p) during the transition, the curtailment was sent to a referendum in 1989, were it approved the amnesty and gained democratic genuineness by 57%. It has to be stated that the major(ip)ity of Uruguayan opposed the amnesty, however the fragile democratic government confronted a troubling decision. They could have breached the Naval Club Pact and tried military officer for heir human right offenses and risked military refusal and therefore a crisis in their own authority. Or they could have hastily grant them amnesty at the cost of displace prestige in the new democracy. It is risk-free to assume that the electorate selectd to let the amnesty right stand not because it was just still more so to avoid a crisis. By 1992 the left-wing Frente Amplio was integrated into Uruguayan politics without each opposite major party leaders deeming them out of the question arriving to the quarrelsome argument that Uruguay became a consolidated democracy.Uruguays scotch development can be dual-lane into two starkly contrasting periods. During the first period, when it earned its valued sobriquet Switzerland of South America, from the late 1800s until the 1950s, Uruguay achieved remarkable growth and a high standard of living. Expanding livestock exports generally beef and wool accounted for its sparing development. The advanced social welfare programs, which redistributed wealth from the livestock sector to the rest of the economy, brocaded the standard of living for the majority of the people and contributed to the development of new industries.When export earnings faltered in the 195 0s, however, the fabric of Uruguays economy had begun to unravel. The country entered a decades-long period of economic stagnation. It was during the administration of President Jorge Pacheco Areco (196772) that Uruguay entered a political and social crisis. As wool and beef demands declined in world markets, export earnings no longer kept pace with the need for greater social expenditures causing bad economic performance that lead to the bureaucratic-authoritarian recall over of government.Although the old democratic regime was not able to lift economic prosperity neither was the military-as-government. Bad economic performance still plagued the nation passim authoritarian rule. By 1980 the military had no agenda in combating the bad economic performance that helped unveil the inadequacies of the non democratic regime. In fact, economic performance has been in a decline since 1950s until today. Although the legitimacy that the democratic system posses in Uruguay is strong, the capacity, or as Stepan and Linz say, the efficacy of the democratic system in resolving the stagnant economy is low.Thus, making Uruguays democracy risk-prone due to an unsolved economic performance. Since the economy has been the number one issue affecting Uruguayans since the end of their well-situated era in the early 19 century. A public opinion cap was asked to fastness class respondents weather a political alternative from the authoritarian regime at the time would speed sort of than slow economic recuperation. By a margin of 2 to 1 they believed it would, more surprisingly was a 7 to 1 response to the question if a new democratic regime would bring more tranquility and public order.In 1985, of the cardinal institutions evaluated in terms of trust, political parties class-conscious highest with a net polish off of 57 and the armed forces with a net score of negative 73. Only 5% viewed the military sympathetically while 78% viewed the military with antipathy. (Linz 153) In my studies concerning democratization never did democracy start with much(prenominal) rejection of the political affair of the military from all class coalitions a same.During the first half on the 19th century the norm was a two party system similar to that of the get together States in that there was low fragmentation and low polarization. (Linz 163) However, wayward to the American vetting demonstrate the Uruguayan had a peculiar electoral system known as the double synchronous select that allows all parties to run bigeminal candidate for the presidency. This did not present a problem until after the 1960s when presidents routinely were elected with less than 25% of the vote because of the amount of candidates running.This creates party fragmentation that can hinder democracy. The fact that the old regime political structure remains untasted means that the opportunity for constitutional metamorphose was missed and this presents a potential democratic upheaval. Beha viorally, by 1968-73 political elites were at best semi-loyal to the democratic system that soon caused the authoritarian regime to take over government, and one thing that can be done from previous failures in democratic attempts is to defraud from their missteps.Stepan and Linz clearly state that for the consolidation of democracy loyalty to the system as well as the perception that all other parties are loyal to the democratic process plays a crucial role. (Linz 156) By 1985 not one of the twelve major factions of the three leading parties perceived the other parties to be acting disloyal. As well as the mere fact that the once un removeable left-wing party, Frente Amplio, held the mayoral position of capital of Uruguay by 1989 and then the presidency by 2004 demonstrates the positive elite choices that contributed to democracy.Since Uruguays difficult and long fought battle for independence in August 25, 1828 Uruguay did not encounter any intermestic stateness problems. As far as chapiter relations to Latin America and in particular Uruguay, the United States continues to pursue hegemony over the domain. The neo-liberal clear ups in place in the region are bound by the restraints of the orbicular market and for a country like Uruguay it is very difficult to compete with such superpowers.These reforms have often left the note classes impoverish and desperate while the upper classes and Washington feed their gluttonous appetites. The civilian government in Uruguay has found it progressively difficult to enforce these foreign economic influences that can potentially result in authoritarian means of accomplishment. As a member of MERCOSUR, Mercado Comun del Sur, Uruguay faced foreign political influences to liberalize its economy during the 1990s, as economic giants, and MERCOSUR partners Brazil and Argentina had done.This can be potentially devastating to democracy except that Uruguay in the 1980s had a crying(a) national product (GNP) per capita inc ome of 2,820, higher than any of its MERCOSUR counterparts. However, we must remember that Uruguay has been experiencing a downwardly economic performance since the mid 1900s and is a potential risk that call for to be addressed to preserve democracy. United States foreign policy in Uruguay and in the rest of Latin America has boost for the liberalization of markets. The side effect of neo-liberal reform is the zero-sum element that produces excessive amounts of losers.Essentially the contrary to what it is intended to produce. These superpower polices implemented creates a couple of(prenominal) winners most of which are elites with government connecter that have been the primary beneficiaries of the sweeping economic transformation. (Kingstone 196) This transcends business when the only means of preserving this market economy is through potential authoritarian means. The contentious claim that Uruguay is a consolidated democracy since 1992 is threefold, first, because of the reluctance to fix the already proven failed double simultaneous vote electoral system.Secondly, because of civil-military relations concerning human rights violation during authoritarian rule, although was legitimized by democratic referendum, but more importantly budgetary cuts that have been implemented as a result of bad economic performance. Finally, and most importantly, Uruguayans accept democracy as the most legalise political game, but also deal its incapacity to fix the troubling economy, producing this efficacy-legitimacy fissure that can be potentially damaging for democracy.These three factors give Uruguay the title of a risk-prone democracy. Works Cited Kingstone, Peter R. , ed. Readings in Latin American Politics. New York Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic variety and Consolidation. Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. ODonnell, Guillermo. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Studies in Sout h American Politics. Berkley Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.